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Jun 16 2012
This Sunday, Greece faces a key election. Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris Passas
argue that in the lead up to the election, populist ‘patriotic’ parties have pursued a rhetorical
strategy aimed at misleading voters about the real relationship between ‘national
independence’ as they define it and membership of the Eurozone.
One of the outstanding features of the ongoing electoral campaign in Greece is the insistence
of several political parties and politicians on the tactical use of half-truths in an effort to win
votes. Despite valiant exceptions, their quasi-institutionalised propensity towards superficial
and unsubstantiated discourse, often coupled with the constant reliance on the ‘wisdom’ of
the leader/hegemon, leads them to the systematic use of slogans that end up misleading
instead of enlightening their intended audience.
There are several examples – even now that the country’s membership of the Eurozone is at
stake – but two stand out. The first is the proposal of the Independent Greeks – a
nationalist/populist party that sprung out of Nea Dimokratia, the main party on the right of the
political spectrum in Greece – to keep Greece in the Eurozone but also ‘retain national
independence’. The second is the support of Nea Dimokratia and PASOK for the issuance of
Eurobonds (of which there are more than one kind) while their leaders constantly refer to sovereignty,
independence, self reliance, etc. One plausible explanation of these references is that Greek politicians are
responding to the sense of humiliation (and anger) generated by various comments made by some European
politicians against Greeks en bloc. However, there is a more plausible alternative explanation. These
proposals are either half-truths or misleading slogans as long as they are not coupled with several necessary
clarifications and details that also make a difference. What are these?
A country’s membership of the European
Union cannot in practice be combined with
the retention of national sovereignty or
independence as the latter is defined by
the ‘patriotic’ populists. This is so because
a core feature of the process of integration
is the gradual sharing of competences
(pooling as it is often called) with European
institutions. These competences, at the
same time, are exercised jointly (i.e. by EU
institutions and the member states) on the
basis of EU treaties. So, for example, the
transition from the drachma to the Euro
entailed (a) the abolition by Greece of the
right to issue its own currency as well as
(b) the direct participation in the
management of the Euro, e.g. via the
Greek finance minister’s, the prime
minister’s and central bank governor’s
membership of the Eurogroup, the
European Council and the decision making bodies of the European Central Bank respectively, where
decisions are made collectively.
Issuing Eurobonds cannot be reconciled with the ‘preservation of national independence’ (as the latter is
defined by the ‘patriotic’ populists) because the relevant political decision – e.g. with regards to the timing and
the terms of the loan – will be made collectively at the European level. It will not be made by individual,
‘independent’ states. Indeed, for this decision to be meaningful, it will be preceded not only by commitments
regarding each participating state’s capacity to put its own house in order, but also by the creation of
European mechanisms for the collective monitoring of their public finances. These commitments and
mechanisms – that are already in the process of being created – though very few talk about them in Greece –
will give meaning to Eurobonds in the sense that investors will be reasonably reassured that they will not lose
their money, e.g. as a result of the propensity of many Greek politicians to clientelism. As a result of this
reassurance, the cost of collective borrowing – which is what the Eurobonds are – will be lower.
As to why – even now – several leading Greek politicians resort to half truths, there are two possibilities, none
of them flattering. Either they are unaware of the precise content or the implications of their proposals or they
consciously prefer to mislead Greeks citizens. The second of these two options is simply unacceptable but
the first is indicative of two broader patterns as exemplified by Nea Dimokratia and PASOK, the two parties
that used to dominate the Greek party system.
Over time both parties have received very generous public funding in order to cover not only their operational
costs but also specifically for training and educating their staff and political personnel. Both have engaged in
such catastrophic mismanagement of these funds that they have ended up having combined debts in excess
of €200 million, whilst also being deprived of a serious policy making capacity. So, if it is not the lack of funds,
what is it?
Both parties have always been top-heavy and lacking in terms of a culture of internal democracy (even when
they were lead by politicians who believed in it). Both parties have, over time, become mechanisms for vote
collection, rather than arenas where alternative ideas are debated, policy proposals identified (with costs
attached to them) and selected in the run up to elections where rational voters would choose from the menu
of alternative options on offer. Central to the absence of a culture of internal democracy is the role of the party
leader. Both parties have almost always been lead by a leaders who ran them via a small (or large) clique of
people who had personal allegiance to him, or in a minority of cases, internal ‘opposition’ fizzled out as soon
as party office or, more often, government posts were handed out to dissenters. As a result of this internal
structure, the renewal of the political personnel is almost impossible if it is meant to go beyond the sphere of
influence of the party leaders.
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